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Abstract 
 
A central goal in devising a system of courts is to make judicial services 
easily accessible.  As a consequence, justice is usually administered in a 
geographically decentralized fashion:  trial courts are distributed across the 
territory in which the jurisdiction’s law is applied.  Corporate law, however, does 
not fit this pattern:  courts are often located far away from the companies subject 
to their jurisdiction.  In particular, Delaware law governs most publicly-traded 
firms in the U.S., and is now extending its reach to encompass corporations 
headquartered around the globe.  But Delaware courts are located only in 
Delaware.  Consequently, there is a large and growing disparity between the 
geographic area where Delaware law is applied and the location of Delaware 
courts.  This disparity is all the more striking because the quality of the Delaware 
judiciary is a prime reason why firms incorporate under Delaware law.  This 
situation provokes a simple question:  would it not be both desirable and feasible 
to have Delaware, and other jurisdictions whose law has extraterritorial reach, 
hold hearings and trials out of state?  The creation of such extraterritorial courts 
might well yield significant benefits:  litigation costs could be lowered, and 
regulatory competition between jurisdictions could be increased with regard to 
both substantive corporate law and judicial services.   
This paper explores the issues involved in such a regime of extraterritorial 
courts.  We consider those issues as they arise within the U.S., within the EU, 
and globally.  We largely limit our analysis to courts whose jurisdiction is confined 
to corporate law.  We note, however, that much of what we say applies as well to 
other areas of commercial law.  Moreover, whatever the merits of extraterritorial 
courts as a practical proposal, in exploring their promise we gain important 
perspective on the basic relationships among substantive law, adjudication, 
territoriality, and sovereignty, and on the differences between private arbitration 
and public adjudication. 
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A central goal in devising a state, national, or supranational court system 
is to make judicial services easily accessible. To reach that goal, justice is 
usually administered in a geographically decentralized fashion:  lower level 
courts tend to be distributed across the territory of the jurisdiction to which they 
belong, and that territory is typically identical with the area where the relevant law 
is applied.2  From an economic perspective, this tendency towards a 
geographically decentralized court system is easy to explain: It will generally be 
cheaper to locate courts near potential litigants than to force litigants and 
witnesses to attend hearings in far-away courts. 
The judicial administration of corporate law, however, does not fit this 
pattern.  At least where publicly traded corporations are concerned, courts are 
often located far away from the companies subject to their jurisdiction.  This is 
the result of the state of incorporation doctrine, which is applied in all U.S. states 
and in many other jurisdictions around the world.3  Under that doctrine, 
corporations are free to choose the state whose law will govern their internal 
affairs.4  Particularly in the United States, but also in other parts of the world, 
corporations make use of that doctrine to opt for corporate law from a jurisdiction 
other than the one where their primary place of business is located.  A striking 
consequence is that Delaware law governs most publicly-traded firms in the 
                                            
2 It is easy to see, for example, that the structure of the federal court system in 
the United States follows this pattern: The district courts and even the courts of appeal 
are spread across the United States.  Similarly, the European Community Treaty, while 
using a different technique, also makes sure that the relevant conditions are met: To the 
extent that Community law is applied in litigation between private parties, the courts of 
the Member States, which are distributed across the United States, have jurisdiction. 
3 Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have traditionally 
applied the state of incorporation doctrine.  See, e.g., Karsten Engsig Sörensen & Mette 
Neville, Corporate Migration in the European Union: An Analysis of the Proposed 14th 
EC Company Law Directive on the Transfer of the Registered Office of a Company from 
One Member State to Another with a Change of Applicable Law, 6 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 
181, 185 (2000); Jens C. Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 
YALE J. INT'L L. 477, 479 n.9 (2004) [hereinafter Dammann, Freedom].  Finland and 
Sweden also appear to fall into this category.  See Paul Krüger Andersen & Karsten 
Engsig Sörensen, Free Movement of Companies from a Nordic Perspective, 6 
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 47, 54-56 (1999).  A number of other Member States 
have traditionally applied the so-called real seat doctrine under which the law of the 
headquarters state governs a corporation’s internal affairs.  However, the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities has recently made it clear that this latter approach 
generally violates the Freedom of Establishment granted by the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community provided that the corporation has been validly formed in another 
Member State.  For a description of the relevant case law see Dammann, Freedom, at 
483-486. 
 4 See FRANKLIN A. GEWURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 36 (2000). 
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U.S.5, and is now extending its reach to encompass corporations headquartered 
around the globe.  
But Delaware courts are located only in Delaware.  Consequently, there is 
a large and growing disparity between the geographic area where Delaware law 
is applied and the location of Delaware courts.  To be sure, courts in other 
jurisdictions can hear disputes arising under Delaware law.  But their judgments 
do not constitute binding precedents with respect to Delaware law.  Moreover, 
even if one focuses solely on the parties’ perspective, courts from other 
jurisdictions will find it hard be seen as an attractive alternative to Delaware.  It is 
precisely because of Delaware’s unusually competent and efficient judiciary that 
many firms choose to incorporate in that state.6  Moreover, quite apart from the 
particular strengths of Delaware courts, when the courts of other states apply 
Delaware corporate law, they are faced with the law of a foreign jurisdiction. 
These observations suggest a simple question:  would it not be both 
desirable and feasible to have Delaware hold hearings and trials out of state?  
Why, for example, does not Delaware set up courts in San Francisco, or 
Frankfurt, or Singapore?  Why, for that matter, does it not set up a court in New 
York City, which would be much more convenient than Wilmington, Delaware, 
even for most of the publicly traded U.S. firms that already incorporate in 
Delaware?  In the remainder of this essay, we explore why this has not been 
done, whether it should be done, and how it might be done. 
Although we use Delaware as an example, there is no reason why other 
important – or wish-to-be important – states or countries that welcome 
incorporation by out-of-state firms might not also create extraterritorial courts.  
The United Kingdom, for example, might choose to facilitate access to their own 
corporation law by the same means, holding hearings and trials elsewhere in 
Europe, in the U.S., or in the world at large.7  Singapore might seek to play the 
same role in East Asia and the Pacific.  Nor is there any reason why 
extraterritorial courts need be confined to corporate law.  The same approach 
could be applied to other aspects of commercial law, such as contract law, where 
actors commonly choose to be governed by the law of a foreign jurisdiction.   
Moreover, whatever the merits of extraterritorial courts as a practical 
proposal, in exploring their promise we gain helpful perspective on the basic 
                                            
5 Cf. DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS, Why Choose Delaware As Your 
Corporate Home?, available at http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml (last visited July 
20, 2005) (claiming that “[m]ore than half a million business entities have their legal 
home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 
58% of the Fortune 500”). 
6 See Black, supra note 12, at 586-89 (1990) (citing the expertise of Delaware 
judges as the primary reason for Delaware’s success in the charter market). 
 7 As pointed out above, the United Kingdom adheres to the state of incorporation 
doctrine.  See Sörensen & Neville, supra note 3, at 185.  
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relationships among substantive law, adjudication, and territoriality, and on the 
differences between private arbitration and public adjudication.  
I. ADVANTAGES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL COURTS 
The creation of extraterritorial courts by popular states of incorporation 
such as Delaware could have a number of significant benefits. 
A. Lowering the Costs of Litigation 
The most obvious advantage is that establishing courts in the geographic 
vicinity of potential litigants should, in many cases, be cheaper than forcing 
potential litigants to litigate in the state of incorporation itself.  Thus, the 
establishment of extraterritorial courts in appropriate locations promises to lower 
the costs of administering justice.   
To be sure, firms can choose to be governed by a state’s corporation law 
without bearing the burden of litigating in that state.  Delaware courts, for 
example, have no monopoly on the application of Delaware law.  Under the state 
of incorporation doctrine, courts in other jurisdictions will apply Delaware law to 
the internal affairs of Delaware corporations.  The courts of other states are not, 
however, an adequate substitute for Delaware courts in applying Delaware law.  
To begin with, a Delaware corporation cannot be certain that the courts of other 
states will accept disputes concerning the corporation’s internal affairs.  Rather, 
courts may8 – and sometimes will9 – invoke the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens10 to refuse to hear cases relating to the internal affairs of foreign 
                                            
8 For an exemplary definition of the forum non conveniens doctrine see Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).   
9 Cf., e.g., Kelley v. American Sugar Refining Co., 42 N.E. 2d 592, 594 (Mass. 
1942) (coming to the conclusion that the questions at issue should be decided by the 
courts of the state of issue incorporation); Thompson v. Southern Connellsville Coke 
Co., 112 A. 533, 534-35 (Pa. 1921) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the internal 
affairs of a foreign corporation); Meade v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 153 P.2d 686, 
689 (Wash. 1944) (holding that “[w]here, as in the case at bar, the controversy 
necessitates interpretation of a statute of the state creating the corporation the general 
rule against interference with the internal affairs of a foreign corporation is strictly 
applied”). 
10 The internal affairs rule was originally considered to be not only a choice of law 
doctrine, but also a jurisdictional doctrine.  As a result, courts would sometimes decline 
to hear cases relating to the internal affairs of foreign corporations based on the 
assumption that they lacked jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Boyette v. Preston Motors Corp., 89 
So 746, 748-49 (Ala. 1921).  However, the modern trend is to apply the forum non 
conveniens doctrine in deciding the question of whether or not to exercise jurisdiction 
over the internal affairs of foreign corporations.  See., e.g., In re Mercantile Guar. Co., 48 
Cal. Rptr. 589, 593 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1965); Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co. of 
America, 229 N.E.2d 53, 539 (Ill. 1967); State v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co. of Delaware, 
2 N.W.2d 372, 390-91 (Iowa 1942); Amatuzio v. Amatuzio, 410 N.W. 2d 871, 874 (Minn. 
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corporations.  Moreover, cases involving Delaware law that are litigated outside 
of Delaware are beyond the influence of the Delaware judiciary, and thus bring 
the risk of undermining the coherence and uniform application of Delaware law.  
Finally, one of the great advantages of Delaware incorporation, it is widely felt, 
lies in access to Delaware’s uniquely capable and efficient judiciary.11  In fact, it 
is arguable that Delaware’s judiciary, rather than the body of substantive doctrine 
offered by Delaware corporate law, is today the principal attraction of Delaware 
incorporation.12 
But is it really a big burden for Delaware corporations to litigate in 
Delaware’s courts?  Two considerations might suggest not. 
1. The Ease of Litigating from a Distance 
To begin with, litigating at a distance has become fairly simple, especially 
in Delaware.  You do not have to go to Delaware to prepare briefs or 
memoranda, review documents, interview witnesses, or take depositions.  In fact, 
the Chancery Court Rules even provide for the electronic filing of documents.13 
However, while much of the work to be done in litigation can be done 
without coming to Wilmington, personal appearances by counsel and litigants are 
still often unavoidable.  And, even if one can litigate from a distance, this may not 
always be the most efficient way to conduct a trial.  It is quite possible that 
corporate clients and their counsel would spend more time before the Chancery 
Court if it were not located so inconveniently.   
Moreover, even rare appearances before a court can be quite 
burdensome for foreign-based firms.  For foreigners, the inconveniences of 
litigating in Delaware include not just the problem of travel and of litigating in a 
foreign language, but also, today, permission to enter the country.  In the worst 
case, a past violation of visa rules or some other misstep proves to be a 
                                                                                                                                  
App. 1987); Sterling Grace & Co. v. Seeman Bros., Inc., 215 N.Y.S. 2d 559, 560-61 
(1961). 
11 See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 40 
(1993) (praising the expertise of Delaware’s judges); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory 
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1911 
(1998) (noting a consensus that Delaware’s judges are one of the reasons for 
Delaware’s success in the charter market); David A. Skeel, Bankcruptcy Judges and 
Bankcruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998) (arguing 
that Delaware’s judges play an “important part” in explaining Delaware’s success in the 
charter market); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 708 (2002) (claiming that “[a] principal attraction of 
incorporating in Delaware is the high quality of its chancery court”). 
12 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and 
Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 586-89 (1990). 
13 Cf. DEL. CH. CT. R. 79.1 (2004) (leaving it up to the Chancellor to determine whether or 
not it is appropriate, in a civil case or in a category of cases, to follow the procedures for 
eFiling). 
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permanent obstacle to entry into the United States.  The unpredictablility of 
United States immigration policy is now a significant deterrent to incorporating in 
the United States. 14 
Perhaps more importantly, the argument that the costs and difficulties of 
communicating at a distance have declined and will continue to decline cuts both 
ways.  Admittedly, lower communication costs mean that litigating in a far-away 
court becomes much easier, thereby reducing the need for extraterritorial courts.  
At the same time, however, any decline in the costs of communicating at a 
distance also means that the number of corporations for which incorporation in a 
foreign jurisdiction becomes feasible increases.  Thus, the demand for 
extraterritorial courts grows.  It is noteworthy in this context that U.S. law firms 
have steadily increased their presence in other countries.  For example, Sullivan 
& Cromvell, Debevoise, and Skadden Arps now have offices in Frankfurt.  To be 
sure, there are many differences between the services provided by courts and 
those provided by law firms.15 Nevertheless, the thesis that low communication 
costs will necessarily lead rational providers of law-related services to reduce 
their physical presence in other jurisdictions seems premature. 
2. The Prevalence of Public Corporations 
Another reason why the geographic remoteness of the courts of Delaware, 
and of would-be Delawares, might seem unimportant is that Delaware’s lead in 
the charter market exists mainly among large, publicly-traded corporations for 
whom litigation in a geographically distant location is not as onerous as it might 
be for smaller litigants.16   
Yet the problems just recited affect even publicly traded corporations, and 
especially foreign firms.  Moreover, while Delaware’s lead is indeed greatest 
among publicly traded corporations, that state is currently home to roughly 
                                            
14 For a more detailed analysis of why non-U.S. firms may be reluctant to 
incorporate in Delaware see Jens C. Dammann, A New Approach to Corporate Choice 
of Law, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Dammann, New 
Approach]. 
15 One might reason, for example, that courts need not be located as close to the 
litigants as lawyers are because courts deal with legally experienced players -- namely 
corporate lawyers -- whereas law firms interact with clients who have no legal training 
and therefore depend more on face-to-face communication. Since most large 
corporations have in-house counsel, however, the force of this logic is unclear. 
16 Cf., e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable 
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1442 (1992) 
(“[C]lose corporations generally incorporate in the states in which their principal places of 
business are located”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law 
and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 522-523 (1994) (“[C]losely held 
corporations almost always incorporate in the same state in which they do all (or most) 
of their business.”). 
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300,000 corporations,17 a number far larger than the total of all publicly traded 
corporations in the United States.  It follows that there may well be quite a few 
Delaware corporations for which the costs of litigating outside the headquarters 
state actually matter.  In fact, despite the large number of closely held firms 
incorporated in Delaware, that state’s dominance in the charter market does not 
extend to close corporations in general, which still typically incorporate in the 
state in which they are headquartered.18  While there are several considerations 
that may help to explain this pattern,19 the relatively large potential costs to a 
small firm of having to litigate in Delaware rather than in the firm’s headquarters 
state appear to be particularly important.20 Indeed, the geographical limits on 
Delaware’s judicial system may explain why Delaware has only a limited 
incentive to compete for close corporations in the first place.  Given that such 
corporations will often litigate in their headquarters state rather than in their state 
of incorporation, a successful effort by Delaware to attract many small out-of-
state corporations might be self-defeating:  The quality of Delaware’s case law 
might deteriorate as a result of conflicting decisions handed down by courts in 
other states.   
B. Invigorating Regulatory Competition 
Another potential benefit of extra-territorial courts lies in stimulating 
regulatory competition in corporate law.  To be sure, not all scholars are 
convinced that regulatory competition benefits shareholders.21  We will not 
pursue that debate here, but will simply accept, for the sake of analysis, the 
prevailing view that, on balance, the ability of firms to choose their state of 
incorporation contributes to overall social welfare.22   
                                            
17 On December 31, 2003, the number of Delaware corporations totaled 297,602.  
E-mail from Cheryl Wyatt, Delaware Division of Corporations (August 24, 2004, 19:43:12 
EST) (on file with author). 
18 See the sources cited supra note 16. 
19 See Jens C. Dammann, Adjudicative Jurisdiction and the Market for Corporate 
Charters, Working Paper (November 2003), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=466760 [hereinafter: Dammann, Adjudicative Jurisdiction] 
(listing and analyzing various factors). 
20 Cf. Dammann, Adjudicative Jurisdiction, supra note 19 (noting that the need to 
litigate in the state of incorporation is likely to deter close corporations from incorporating 
out of state).  Cf. also Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 
WASH. U. L. Q. 365, 374-375 (1992) (arguing that the risk of having to litigate outside of 
the headquarters state constitutes one of the factors motivating close corporations to 
incorporate locally). 
21 For a critical view see, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, 
Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 
1820 (2002) (empirical evidence fails to show that state competition benefits 
shareholders). 
22 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 222 (1991) (while one may search in vain for a race to 
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Extraterritorial courts could invigorate charter competition in several ways.  
We begin with the situation inside the United States and then turn to the 
international context. 
1. Within the United States 
We have already observed that extraterritorial courts would help make 
out-of-state incorporation a feasible alternative for close corporations.  Thus, the 
phenomenon of charter competition, which remains largely restricted to publicly-
traded corporations,23 could potentially be extended to close corporations.  In 
addition, extraterritorial courts might help other American states compete with 
Delaware for corporations of all types.  While there are many reasons why 
Delaware has risen to dominance in the charter market, one mundane but 
important factor may simply be that Delaware is located more advantageously 
than many of its potential competitors, such as Nevada.24 
2. Between Nations 
If U.S. jurisdictions – most conspicuously, Delaware – were to establish 
courts in leading European or Asian cities, the presently modest rate at which 
foreign corporations seek U.S. charters might expand considerably.  There are, 
of course, potential obstacles to the incorporation of foreign firms under U.S. law 
quite apart from the transaction costs of litigating in courts situated in the U.S.25 – 
obstacles that subsist even where foreign countries, like U.S. states, apply the 
state of incorporation doctrine.26  Most importantly, incorporation in the United 
                                                                                                                                  
the top, state competition creates a “powerful tendency” to enact laws benefiting 
shareholders); Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters and the Lesson of 
Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 847 (1993) (state competition benefits 
shareholders “on balance”). 
23 As pointed out above, the majority of close corporations incorporate locally.  
See the sources cited supra note 16. 
24 In this connection, it is worth noting that New Jersey, which borders the state 
and city of New York, was the first leading state of incorporation, until it lost its position 
to nearby Delaware as a result of inopportune legal reforms.  See, e.g., Demetrios G. 
Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, 970 
(1995); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 11, at 731. 
25 For a detailed description and analysis of these obstacles see Jens C. 
Dammann, Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 477, 483-
507 (2004). 
26 Traditionally, many European countries have applied the so-called real seat 
doctrine according to which the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the law 
of the real seat country.  See, e.g., Dammann, Freedom of Choice, supra note 25, at 
479.  To be sure, a number of recent decisions by the European Court of Justice have 
made it clear that the real seat state cannot, as a general rule, apply its own corporate 
law to a corporation formed in another Member State, without violating the Freedom of 
Establishment guaranteed by the Treaty Establishing the European Community.  
However, given that U.S. corporations are not protected by the Freedom of 
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States would subject foreign firms to U.S. federal income taxation,27 would 
expose them to non-corporate litigation in the United States28, and would often 
prompt the application of the U.S. rules on securities regulation.29  Nonetheless, 
there may be many firms – including particularly new firms – that would take 
advantage of Delaware incorporation today if corporate law litigation could be 
conducted closer to home.  Furthermore, these other obstacles to U.S. 
incorporation may well diminish with time, and there may be pressure to 
eliminate them even faster if U.S. incorporation could otherwise be made more 
attractive to foreign firms. 
Cross-national corporate chartering need not, moreover, be limited to 
attracting non-U.S. firms to Delaware.  Extraterritorial courts could help other 
nations, as well, become attractive jurisdictions for incorporation.  Singapore, as 
we have mentioned, might play such a role in East Asia and the Pacific.  And 
there could be similar developments within the European Union.  Incorporation in 
other Member States is much more feasible for European-based firms than is 
incorporation in a U.S. jurisdiction such as Delaware.30  As European law, in the 
                                                                                                                                  
Establishment, the afore-mentioned case law is without immediate relevance to them.  
This said, the situation of U.S. corporations based in Europe gets even more 
complicated as one considers bilateral treaties concluded between the United States 
and European Countries.  For example, art. XXV of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation (TFCN) between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States 
provides that “companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within 
the territories of either Party […] shall have their juridical status recognized within the 
territories of the other Party.”  See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 
29, 1954, U.S.- F.R.G., 7 U.S.T. 1839.  It is open to discussion whether and to what 
extent that provision compels German courts to apply U.S. corporate law to the internal 
affairs of U.S. corporations headquartered in Germany.  For a detailed analysis of this 
issue see Jens C. Dammann, Amerikanische Gesellschaften mit Sitz in Deutschland 
[U.S. Corporations Headquartered in Germany], 68 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
und internationales Privatrecht [RabelsZ] 607, 609-652 (2004). 
27 See Dammann, New Approach, supra note 1.  
28 Dammann, New Approach, supra note 1. 
29 Dammann, New Approach, supra note 1.  For some firms, of course, exposure 
to U.S. securities regulation may be an advantage rather than a disadvantage.  In 
particular, it has been suggested that foreign firms may be see the application of U.S. 
securities law as a valuable bonding device.  See, in particular, John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Future As History: The Prospects for Global Corporate Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 674 (1999).  
30 To be sure, the act of reincorporation is expensive, because the Member 
States often lack clear-cut lack provisions allowing cross-border mergers, and where 
corporations cannot reincorporate via cross-border mergers, reincorporation may lead to 
significant tax penalties.  See, e.g., Dammann, Freedom of Choice, supra note 25, at 
489-90.  However, that problem does not arise with regard to a corporation’s first choice 
of domicile.  There, a corporation is free to choose the Member State whose law it 
prefers. 
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wake of the Centros decision31, moves toward freedom for EU companies to 
incorporate in any EU member state,32 the opportunity increases for a small 
state, such as Luxemburg or Malta – or even a larger state, such as the UK -- to 
become the Delaware of Europe.  And, while the distances separating the EU 
member states are not enormous, it is still far more convenient for German firms 
to litigate in Frankfurt than in Malta. 
One may, of course, reasonably believe that not all jurisdictions worldwide 
should be allowed to compete in the market for corporate charters.  However, the 
question of who should or should not be permitted to compete in the charter 
market is one that can most appropriately be solved at the level of the rules 
governing corporate conflict of laws.  If one believes that certain jurisdictions 
should not be allowed to compete for incorporations, the obvious solution is a 
rule according to which the law of those jurisdictions will not be applied despite 
the fact that firms are incorporated there. 
C. Creating Competition in the Area of Judicial Services 
Extraterritorial courts would be a start in bringing the benefits of 
competition, not just to substantive corporate law, but also to judicial services.  
To be sure, litigants eager to get the best judicial services at the lowest price 
have a certain degree of choice even under the present system.  By means of 
forum selection clauses, which federal courts33 and most state courts34 in the 
U.S. generally recognize as valid, litigants can select among a broad menu of 
state courts, and, provided federal courts have jurisdiction, can also litigate in the 
latter.  However, as long as state courts are limited to the territory of their 
respective states, problems of distance render that freedom to choose 
meaningless for the vast majority of litigants.  Indeed, only those corporations for 
whom the additional costs of litigating in Delaware are relatively insignificant 
have a clear choice between forums in different states.   
                                            
 31 Case 212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvers-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-
1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (1999).  
 32 See, e.g., Dammann, Freedom of Choice, supra note 25. at 483-507 
(describing the development in the Community and contrasting the situation in the 
European Community with that in the United States). 
33 See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1972). 
34 See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d 498, 503 
(Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 974 (1980); SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & 
Assocs., Inc., 640 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Ark. 1982); ABC Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Harvey, 701 
P.2d 137, 139 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. Diaz, 378 A.2d 108, 
109 (Conn. C.P. 1977); Elia Corp. v. Paul N. Howard Co., 391 A.2d 214, 216 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1978); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. 1986); Calanca v. D & S 
Mfg. Co., 510 N.E.2d 21, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Prudential Res. Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 
S.W.2d 97, 99 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Hauenstein & Bermeister, Inc. v. Met-Fab Indus., 
Inc., 320 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 1982); High Life Sales Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp., 
823 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. 1992). 
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With extraterritorial courts, the costs of choosing among alternative judicial 
forums would decrease appreciably.  Differences in the speed and quality of 
adjudication between home state courts and (say) Delaware courts would 
become apparent, with consequent pressure on the former to improve.  That 
pressure might come as much from force of example as from any desire to retain 
jurisdiction over corporate disputes.  It is noteworthy, in this respect, that the 
federal bankruptcy proceedings in Delaware are conspicuously efficient in 
comparison to those in federal courts elsewhere in the country.35  This is not 
because of direct competition between federal and state courts in Delaware, 
since bankruptcy law is federal and proceedings must be in federal courts.36 One 
reason may be that in practice nominees for Delaware's bankruptcy court are 
likely to be chosen from among the number of the Delaware bar.37  As David 
Skeel has pointed out, the Delaware bar has every incentive to be just as careful 
in nominating bankruptcy court judges as it is in nominating candidates for the 
Chancery Court or Supreme Court.38  However, there may also be a more 
mundane explanation for the efficiency of Delaware’s bankruptcy court: At close 
range, Delaware’s judicial culture may simply be infectious by virtue of the 
example that the Chancellors and Vice-Chancellors set.  
Competition in the field of judicial services may be even more important in 
the international context, and particularly when there is a choice between 
common law and civil law courts.  Partisans of common law courts extol their 
political independence.39  Partisans of civil law courts extol their proficiency at 
fact-finding.40 Extraterritorial courts would expose the partisans of each judicial 
culture to the actual functioning of the other, enlarging the possibility that both 
cultures might be influenced for the better. 
                                            
35 See, in particular, David A. Skeel  What's So Bad About Delaware  VAND. L. 
REV. 309  310 (2001). (noting that “bankruptcy process seems to be unusually efficient in 
Delaware”). 
36 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some 
Thoughts on Delaware, 1 Del L. Rev., 1, 31 (1998). 
 37 Id.   
 38 Id. 
39 See, e.g., Gene R. Shreve, Section I: Rhetoric, Pragmatism and the 
Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Criticism - A Study of Altruistic Judicial Argument, 46 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 41, 48 n.25 (1988, Supplement) (claiming that “compared to their colleagues 
in civil- law countries, American judges enjoy enormous political independence to decide 
what the law is and how it should be applied.”). 
40 John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823, 824 (1985) (praising the German approach to fact-gathering, which accords 
judges a more central role than U.S. law does). 
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II. LEGAL OBSTACLES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL 
COURTS 
Under current law, the ability of jurisdictions to set up extraterritorial courts 
is severely restrained.  Whether in the United States, in the European 
Community, or in the international arena, the general rule is that extraterritorial 
courts cannot be created without the permission of the jurisdiction where the 
court is to be established. 
A. Between Unrelated Sovereigns 
For the sake of simplicity, it is helpful to start with the prospect of creating 
a court in the territory of an unrelated sovereign -- that is, another country.  There 
can be little doubt that this requires the permission of the host state.  The 
principle of state sovereignty is generally acknowledged to imply that “officials of 
one state may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state without 
the latter's consent”.41  In other words, territorial sovereignty comprises the 
exclusive power to perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions.42  
Moreover, there is no question that state judges administering the law of their 
jurisdiction qualify as state officials. 
To be sure, when it comes to the administration of justice, there are some 
grey areas with regard to the limits of the principle of territorial sovereignty.  
Thus, different views exist as to whether the principle of territorial sovereignty is 
                                            
41 See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States section 
432 ct. b (1987) (“It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that 
officials of one state may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state 
without the latter's consent.”)  Cf. also Michael Milde, Sovereignty, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF  
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. IV, 500, 516 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed. 2000), IAN 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW  310 (5th ed. 1998) 310 (stating the 
governing principle to be that a state cannot take measure on the territory of another 
state by way of enforcement of national laws without the consent of the latter).  Cf. also 
Gunther Handl, State Liability for Accidental Transitional Environmental Damage by 
Private Persons, 74 A.J.I.L. 525 (1980) (defining territorial sovereignty as “the exclusive 
right to exercise the functions of a state within a certain portion of the globe”); Silvia B. 
Pinera-Vazquez, Comment, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and International Banking: A 
Conflict of Interests, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449 (1988) (“Simply stated, a state has 
exclusive authority over the exercise of governmental power within its borders.”); 
Bernard H. Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of 
Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 733, 764 (1983) (“The term ‘judicial sovereignty’ implies respect for the 
exclusivity of governmental organs within their own territories -- the monopoly of 
governmental power that lies at the heart of territorial sovereignty.”).   
42 Douglas M. Zang, Note, Frozen in Time: The Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Convention, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 722, 738 (1991) (“Territorial sovereignty describes a 
sovereign's competence to exercise legislative, executive, and judicial functions within its 
dominion.”).  See further. 
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violated by acts that require the participation of public officials under the law of 
the country whose territorial sovereignty is at stake but not under the law of the 
country whose courts are in charge of the relevant legal proceedings.  In the 
landmark case Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospastiale v. United States,43 
the U.S. Supreme Court took the view that U.S. Courts could order the taking of 
evidence by the parties’ attorneys where the evidence was located in the territory 
of another nation, even though, under the law of the relevant foreign country, the 
taking of evidence constituted a public act.44 Moreover, one U.S. district court 
denied a violation of the territorial sovereignty of other states where a defendant 
on foreign soil was served with summons and notice, stressing the informational 
character of such an act.45  By contrast, a violation of the principle of territorial 
sovereignty was thought to occur if compulsory process was served.46  In any 
event, no court appears to have taken the view that the holding of a trial in 
another country is possible under international law without the consent of the 
host state. 
International treaties, moreover, do not change this outcome.  The 
decisive treaty in this context is the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence 
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,47 which came into force in 1972.  While 
that convention provides for the taking of evidence in the territory of another 
country, it does so within narrow limits.  According to art. 16 of the convention, a 
diplomatic officer or consular agent may, in the territory of another Contracting 
State, take the evidence, without compulsion, of nationals of the State in which 
he exercises his functions or of a third State.  However, a competent authority 
designated by the State in which he exercises his functions must have given its 
permission either generally or in the particular case, and the diplomatic officer or 
consular agent must comply with the conditions which the competent authority 
has specified in the permission.  Art. 17 provides for the taking of evidence by “a 
person duly appointed as a commissioner for the purpose”, but imposes the 
same requirements as art. 16.  Art. 18 points out that the host country may allow 
a diplomatic officer, consular agent or commissioner authorized to take evidence 
to apply to the competent authority designated by the declaring State for 
appropriate assistance to obtain the evidence by compulsion.  However, it is up 
to the host state to decide whether or not to grant that wish.  In sum, the Hague 
                                            
43 Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospastiale v. United States, 482 U.S. 522 
(1987). 
44 See id. at 539-540 (holding that „the Hague Convention did not deprive the 
District Court of the jurisdiction it otherwise possessed to order a foreign national party 
before it to produce evidence physically located within a signatory nation”). 
45 Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 
636 F.2d 1300, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
46 Id. 
47 The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or 
Commercial Matters, opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 
7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231. 
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Evidence Convention does little to restrain the territorial sovereignty of the host 
state. 
B. Within the United States 
Within the United States, the situation is somewhat more complex.  Three 
questions need to be distinguished.  First, can a state set up one of its own 
courts in the territory of a sister state without the latter’s consent?  Second, would 
an agreement between the states involved suffice to create such courts, or would 
one also have to secure the approval of the U.S. Congress under the Compact 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution?  Third, could the U.S. Congress allow states to 
establish extraterritorial courts in the territory of other states without the latter’s 
consent, or would a federal statute to this effect be unconstitutional? 
1. The Consent of the Host State 
The first of these questions is also the easiest to answer.  It has been held 
that “[a] court of a state cannot legally hold hearings, or conduct trials, beyond its 
borders.”48 To be sure, that statement has typically been based on the law of the 
state to which the relevant court belonged, rather than on the U.S. constitution.49  
                                            
48 Knight v. Younkin, 105 P.2d 456, 457 (Id. 1940).  Accord, People v. Craig, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (1992) (“It is a universally accepted principle of law that a court may 
not sit outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction, for any reason whatsoever, even with 
(and a fortiori, without,) the consent of all parties, and any proceeding so conducted is a 
nullity […].”).  See also Board of Commrs. of Marion Co. v. Barker, 25 Kan. 258, 260 
(1881).  There, the county commissioners of Marion county, Kansas, were said to have 
levied taxes while meeting outside the state of Kansas or at least outside Marion county.  
The court pointed out that this made their acts void.  “The commissioners”, the Court 
held, “are officers of the county, and in the absence of express provision their powers do 
not go beyond the territorial limits of their county. […] They clearly have no powers to 
levy taxes when beyond the limits of the state. They could not convene as a board at 
Kansas City, or St. Joseph, in Missouri, and apportion or order the levy of taxes in 
Kansas. Such an order would be void, and of no validity whatever.” Interestingly, the 
Court also pointed out that the Commissioners “acted without jurisdiction, whether we 
consider the levying of taxes as acting ministerially, judicially, or legislatively.” Of course, 
most of the relevant statements do not refer to borders of a state.  See, e.g., O'Daniel v. 
Inter-Island Resorts, 377 P.2d 609, 616 (Haw. 1962) (holding, with regard to the Circuit 
Courts of Hawaii, that “proceedings held in a law case at a place beyond the boundaries 
of the circuit are […] a nullity”); Phillips v. Thralls, 26 Kan. 780, 781 (1882) (pointing out, 
in a case regarding the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, who had been elected in a 
township, that “this is generally true of all officers, judicial or ministerial; their power to 
act is circumscribed by certain territorial limits, and action outside those limits binds no 
one.”).  
 49 In People v. Craig, 581 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (1992), the Court justified its 
decision by pointing out that “[t]here is nothing in CPL Art. 660 to suggest that it was 
intended to permit a conditional examination outside the state.”  Similarly, in O'Daniel v. 
Inter-Island Resorts, 377 P.2d 609 (Haw. 1962), the Court invoked the statutory law of 
Hawaii.   See id. at 614 (“The obvious purpose of this section is to restrict the exercise of 
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However, there seems little doubt that a state cannot establish courts on the 
territory of another state where the latter has not given its permission.50  To be 
sure, the principle of territorial sovereignty of states is no longer understood as 
rigidly as it once was.  In particular, the notion that a state can only exercise 
jurisdiction over persons and property located in its territory51 has long been 
rejected. However, no one seems to have suggested that states could go as far 
as to establish their institutions on the territory of other states without violating 
the territorial sovereignty of the latter. 
2. The Approval of the U.S. Congress 
A more challenging question is whether two states can agree on the 
creation of extraterritorial courts without the approval of the U.S. Congress.   
Under the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution, “[n]o State shall, 
without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with 
another State.”52  However, it is generally accepted that this provision must be 
read more narrowly than its wording suggests.  The purpose of the Compact 
Clause is to “protect the full and free exercise of Federal authority”.53  
Consequently, “not all agreements between states are subject to the strictures of 
the Compact Clause.”54 Rather, “the application of the Compact Clause is limited 
to agreements that are directed to the formation of any combination tending to 
the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or 
interfere with the just Supremacy of the United States.” 55  
When it comes to the creation of extraterritorial corporate law courts, there 
is no reason to believe that an agreement to this effect would threaten the 
Supremacy of the United States in any way.  Admittedly, one might argue that 
                                                                                                                                  
judicial power by each of the four circuit courts to the territorial limits prescribed for it.”).  
In Board of Commrs. of Marion Co. v. Barker, 25 Kan. 258, 260 (1881), the Court also 
appears to base its decision on state law when it explains that the powers of county 
officers do not, “in the absence of express provision”, go “beyond the territorial limits of 
their county”.  In Knight v. Younkin, 105 P.2d 456, 457 (Id. 1940), the Court fails to give 
an clear justification for its claim that that “court of a state cannot legally hold hearings, 
or conduct trials, beyond its borders.”  However, the fact that it cites the afore-mentioned 
decision Board of Commrs. of Marion Co. v. Barker, suggests that the relevant principle 
is seen to be rooted in the law of the state to which the court belongs.  The decision 
Phillips v. Thralls, 26 Kan. 780, 782 (1882), also fits this pattern, because the Court 
defends its decision, inter alia, by reference to the state’s Criminal Code. 
 50 See also Bragg v. Walker, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17575, p. 10 (referring to 
„those […] principles of federalism which preclude the officers of one state from 
intentionally executing their warrants in a neighboring state”). 
 51 See, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 52 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.  
 53 See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 520 (1893). 
 54 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 469 (1978). 
 55 Id. at 471. 
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such courts would enable Delaware to be even more successful in establishing 
its corporate law as a de-facto national law.  However, it is hard to see how the 
prevalence of Delaware law can encroach upon or interfere with the Supremacy 
of the United States.  After all, Delaware corporate law exists only by the grace of 
the U.S. Congress, and – as Mark Roe has argued – even in the absence of 
federal legislation, the content of Delaware corporate law may be shaped by the 
influence of federal lawmakers.56 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has given some 
guidance as to which factors are to be taken into account in applying the 
Compact Clause.   In a 1978 case, the Court refused to classify the agreement 
establishing the Multistate Tax Commission as a compact requiring 
Congressional approval.57  It argued, inter alia, that the agreement did not 
“purport to authorize the member States to exercise any powers they could not 
exercise in its absence”, that it did not provide for “any delegation of sovereign 
power to the Commission”, and that “each state [was] free to withdraw at any 
time.”58  Arguably, these considerations can also be invoked with regard to the 
issue at hand.  An agreement aiming at the creation of extraterritorial court would 
not increase the jurisdiction of the state to which the relevant courts belong.  
Delaware, for example, would still be exercising the same power it exercised 
before, namely the power to adjudicate the internal affairs of Delaware 
corporations.  Nor would the host state delegate its sovereign power.  Finally, the 
permission to establish a court on another state’s territory need not be a 
permanent one.   In sum, there is little reason to believe that an agreement 
between two or more states stipulating the creation of extraterritorial courts would 
require congressional approval under the Compact Clause. 
3. The Ability of the U.S. Congress to Allow the Creation of 
Extraterritorial Courts 
The question remains whether the U.S. Congress could allow states, via a 
federal statute, to create extraterritorial states within the United States without 
the consent of the host state. 
 A possible basis for such a statute might be the Interstate Commerce 
Clause.59  Under the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, the activities that 
Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause fall into three categories.  
Congress “may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce,”60 "the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate 
                                            
 56 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L.REV. 588, 601-634 
(2003) (arguing the threat of federal intervention  is bound to influence the shape of 
Delaware law). 
 57 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978). 
 58 Id. at 473. 
 59 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 60 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
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commerce,"61 as well as "activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce."62  Of course, that third category has been narrowed considerably in 
recent years.  Earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court63 had been read to 
hold that Congress could regulate activities that, in aggregate, had a substantial 
impact on interstate commerce. Now, however, the U.S. Supreme Court adheres 
to a less generous understanding of the Commerce Clause.  At least where non-
economic activities are concerned, the aggregate theory no longer applies. 64This 
said, one might make the case that a federal statute of the type at issue would be 
admissible even under this modern view of the Commerce Clause.  After all, the 
act of incorporating in another state is an economic rather than a non-economic 
activity, and the same can be said of the resulting litigation. 
Of course, even if one agrees that a federal statute allowing for the 
extraterritorial creation of state commerce falls within the general scope of the 
commerce clause, there remains a second obstacle to overcome.  Under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution65, Congress has the 
power "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution 
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."  
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that legislaton based on 
the power to regulate interstate commerce must be “proper for carrying into 
Execution the Commerce Clause”.66  Furthermore, the Court has held that 
federal laws which violate state sovereignty cannot be proper for carrying into 
Execution the Commerce Clause.67  Thus, the decisive question becomes 
whether a statute of the type at issue here can be reconciled with constitutionally 
mandated principles of state sovereignty.  The answer to that question remains 
unsettled.  
Up to now, the U.S. Supreme Court has found violations of state 
sovereignty in essentially three areas.  In New York v. United States, the Court 
                                            
 61 Id.  
 62 Id.at 559 
 63 See, in particular, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that 
“even if [an] activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may 
still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic 
effect on interstate commerce”) 
 64 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). (“[The statute at issue] is 
not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory 
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It cannot, 
therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out 
of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce.”). 
65 U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 18. 
66 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (quoting The Federalist No. 33, at 
204 (A. Hamilton)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-733 (1999) (quoting Printz).  
67 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (quoting The Federalist No. 33, at 
204 (A. Habilton)); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-733 (1999) (quoting Printz). 
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made it clear that Congress may not “commandeer the legislative processes of 
the States by directly compelling them to enact or enforce a federal regulatory 
program.”68 In Printz v. United States, the Court added that “Congress cannot 
circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the state’s officers directly.”69  In other 
words, “the Federal Government may [..] [not] command the States’ officers […] 
to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”70 Finally, in Fmc v. S.C. 
State Ports Authority, the Court has held that “the Eleventh Amendment prevents 
congressional authorization of suits brought by private parties against 
unconsenting states.”71  Each of these categories involve entrenchments on state 
sovereignty that seem far more serious than merely conducting civil litigation 
without involvement of the host state’s officials.  Consequently, while existing 
precedent does not clearly authorize federal authorization of extraterritorial state 
courts, neither do the concerns reflected in that precedent argue strongly that 
such legislation would be unconstitutional,  
C. Within the European Community 
In the European Community, the Member States retain their territorial 
sovereignty unless Community law provides otherwise.  As regards cross-border 
judicial cooperation, there are far-reaching limitations on the principle of territorial 
sovereignty, yet they remain restricted to the taking of evidence. The pertinent 
Community legislation is contained in the Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 
of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the 
taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters (CR-CCE).72  Under art. 17 CR-
CCE,73 the court of one Member State can request to take evidence directly in 
                                            
68505 U.S. 144, 161 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 
U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). 
69 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
70 Id. 
71 535 U.S. 743, 767-768 (2002). 
72 Official Journal L 174, 27/06/2001 P. 1-24. 
73 See art. 17 of the regulation, which reads: “1. Where a court requests to take 
evidence directly in another Member State, it shall submit a request to the central body 
or the competent authority referred to in art. 3(3) in that State, using form I in the Annex.  
2. Direct taking of evidence may only take place if it can be performed on a voluntary 
basis without the need for coercive measures.  Where the direct taking of evidence 
implies that a person shall be heard, the requesting court shall inform that person that 
the performance shall take place on a voluntary basis.  3. The taking of evidence shall 
be performed by a member of the judicial personnel or by any other person such as an 
expert, who will be designated, in accordance with the law of the Member State of the 
requesting court. 4. Within 30 days of receiving the request, the central body or the 
competent authority of the requested Member State shall inform the requesting court if 
the request is accepted and, if necessary, under what conditions according to the law of 
its Member State such performance is to be carried out, using form J. In particular, the 
central body or the competent authority may assign a court of its Member State to take 
part in the performance of the taking of evidence in order to ensure the proper 
application of this Article and the conditions that have been set out. The central body or 
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another Member State, and the requested Member state can only reject that 
request on very limited grounds.74  While this provision is far-reaching by 
international standards, it stops far short of complete freedom to establish 
extraterritorial courts.  
Thus, the decisive question is whether the Community legislator could 
impose the relevant concept via Community legislation. Art. 5 (1) TEC 
establishes the general principle that the Community shall act within the limits of 
the powers conferred upon it by the TEC.  The issue is therefore whether the 
Treaty provides a basis for enacting Community legislation of the type at issue. 
One provision to be considered in this context is art. 65 TEC, according to 
which the Community shall take measures in the field of “judicial cooperation in 
civil matters” including measures that eliminate “obstacles to the good functioning 
of civil proceedings.”  It is far from obvious, however, whether that provision 
would cover the legislation in question here.  To be sure, a rule of the type at 
issue would certainly eliminate obstacles to the good functioning of civil 
proceedings, namely obstacles of a geographical nature.  It is less clear, though, 
whether such a rule would not go beyond what can properly be described as 
“judicial cooperation.”  After all, the rule at hand would have the effect of making 
judicial cooperation unnecessary by allowing states to administer justice in other 
Member States without having to rely on the cooperation of local courts.   
This said, a rule allowing the establishment of extraterritorial courts could 
very probably be based on art.. 95(1)(2) TEC, which provides for the Council to 
adopt measures facilitating the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market.  A rule of the type at issue would make it easier for corporations to make 
use of the freedom of establishment, which – like the other fundamental 
freedoms – is at the core of the internal market as defined in art. 14(2) TEC.  
Hence, the rule at issue would have as its objective the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market as required by art. 95(1)(2) TEC. 
D. What Is at Stake 
When interpreting the power of a state to exclude from its territory the 
courts of other states, or when interpreting the power of a a federal government 
such as the United States or the European Union to require member states to 
accept such courts, it is of course critical to focus on the practical issues 
                                                                                                                                  
the competent authority shall encourage the use of communications technology, such as 
videoconferences and teleconferences.  5. The central body or the competent authority 
may refuse direct taking of evidence only if: (a) the request does not fall within the scope 
of this Regulation as set out in Article 1; (b) the request does not contain all of the 
necessary information pursuant to Article 4; or (c) the direct taking of evidence 
requested is contrary to fundamental principles of law in its Member State. 6. Without 
prejudice to the conditions laid down in accordance with paragraph 4, the requesting 
court shall execute the request in accordance with the law of its Member State.” 
74 See supra note 73. 
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involved.  The ability to hold trials in another state need involve no meaningful 
increase in the substantive authority of one state over the citizens of another, 
which is presumably the central issue in sovereignty.  The disputes involved are 
already subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state that will conduct the 
trial.  No increase in that jurisdiction is at stake.  The only important question is 
where the trial will be held.  Since we are dealing here with the internal affairs of 
corporations, there is an important sense in which the principal parties in interest 
– the corporation itself, its shareholders, and its managers – are on notice of, and 
have consented to, the law of the incorporating state, including any provisions of 
that law which provide for proceedings to be held in other states.  Finally, the 
very purpose of conducting out-of-state proceedings is to make them less 
burdensome for the litigants. 
This is not to deny that extraterritorial courts might have disadvantages.  
We explore those next.  It is not clear, however, that any of these disadvantages 
can be considered a significant interference with the sovereignty of the host 
state. 
III. THE POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS 
From the point of view of society as a whole, extraterritorial courts for 
corporate law seem to have few drawbacks.  There are, however, some potential 
difficulties worth considering. 
A. The Lack of a Uniform Environment 
To begin with, there is a risk that extraterritorial courts would compromise 
the quality of the law of the exporting state.  There is reason to believe, in 
particular, that the effectiveness of Delaware’s courts derives in important part 
from an ethic fostered by the local environment – which consists of other judges, 
legislators, and local lawyers, all of whom have an interest in keeping the 
Delaware courts functioning well.  A single judge sitting in, say, Frankfurt might 
be more influenced by the local legal culture in Frankfurt than by the legal culture 
in Wilmington, and hence might not, in the long run, function as effectively as the 
core Delaware judiciary. 
The problem could be particularly acute for the highly independent judges 
of common law systems who, in contrast with their counterparts in some of the 
more administratively organized judicial systems of civil law countries, cannot 
easily be disciplined if they do not perform as expected.  Removing a judge who 
does not seem in line with his colleagues in Delaware is not really an option.  
Delaware judges are appointed for 12-year terms.75 Any attempt to shorten that 
period could be perceived as an attempt to reduce the independence of judges.  
And where it is necessary to have judges skilled in languages different from that 
of the home state, the expedient of selecting for foreign posts only judges who 
                                            
75 DEL. CONST. art IV, § 3 (2004). 
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have already proven themselves in the jurisdiction’s domestic courts may not be 
workable. 
Nevertheless, the threat that extraterritorial courts pose to the quality of 
Delaware law (or to the law of other popular states of incorporation) should not 
be overestimated.  Judges could be brought back to Delaware at regular intervals 
for meetings and conferences to reinforce their cultural ties.  Moreover, Delaware 
judges stationed abroad would have important reputational incentives to remain 
in step with the rest of the Delaware judiciary.  If extraterritorial Delaware judges 
were to distance themselves from their Delaware-based colleagues, their 
judgments would likely be reversed more often.  In addition, such a course of 
action would probably lead corporate litigants to avoid the extraterritorial court in 
question, be it by litigating elsewhere or by refraining from incorporating in 
Delaware in the first place.  After all, corporations chose Delaware as a domicile 
precisely because they have a preference for Delaware law as it is typically 
applied by the Delaware judiciary.  In sum, an extraterritorial Delaware judge 
driven by the desire to preserve her standing among her peers would be ill-
advised to deviate from the Delaware style of judging. 
B. The Neutrality of Delaware Judges 
One might also be concerned that extraterritorial courts could pose a 
challenge to the neutrality of Delaware judges: In Delaware cases, litigants are 
almost always from out of state.  That, in turn, means that as long as Delaware 
courts are sitting in Delaware, Delaware judges are objectively free from any 
home state bias.  And just as importantly, corporations can easily recognize that 
there is no reason to be concerned about home state bias.   
At first glance, at least, that might change once extraterritorial courts are 
established.  After all, once a Delaware court is sitting in, say, Frankfurt, a 
reasonable party from another country, e.g., France, might fear a pro-German 
bias in favor of German litigants. 
 Of course, upon close examination, that risk seems manageable.  To 
begin with, it may be too pessimistic to fear that judges at extraterritorial courts 
are at risk of developing, or of being seen as developing, a significant bias in 
favor of locally headquartered corporations.  After all, for reputational reasons, 
such judges would presumably want to be perceived as being successful in 
attracting corporate litigants.  And any observable or even suspected bias would 
lead litigants to avoid the court in question. Moreover, the same mechanism that 
ensures the absence of a home state bias with respect to Delaware courts sitting 
in Delaware could be used with regard to Delaware courts established in other 
jurisdictions. That is, one could simply place such courts in small but centrally 
located jurisdictions.  For example, a Delaware court set up in Luxembourg 
would be conveniently placed to hear cases arising in France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium without engendering any doubts regarding its 
neutrality.   Finally and perhaps most importantly, it is noteworthy that even the 
present system does not completely eliminate the risk of biased judges.  To be 
sure, the tiny number of corporations headquartered in Delaware largely ensures 
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that home state bias is not a major concern.  However, there always is the 
possibility that Delaware judges will prefer U.S.-based corporations over foreign 
ones.  After all, it is not entirely unreasonable to suspect that an American judge 
sitting in Delaware might consciously or subconsciously be biased in favor of 
U.S. firms.  At least with regard to extraterritorial courts established outside the 
United States, then, the risk of facing biased judges may not increase 
importantly. 
C. Would There Be Enough Business? 
There is also the risk that there might not be enough business in most 
foreign jurisdictions to make extraterritorial courts worthwhile.  For example, the 
U.S. West Coast states seem distant enough from Delaware to provide a 
sufficient number of corporations that would like to litigate there instead of in 
Delaware.  But perhaps the same would not be true for other regions of the U.S.  
For example, would a separate Delaware court with a permanent judge make 
sense in Chicago or Houston or Miami?  Or Frankfurt or Paris or London?  The 
answer is unclear, and of course depends importantly on whether the availability 
of an extraterritorial court would itself increase Delaware incorporations 
substantially in the region where the court sits.   
It should also be noted that extraterritorial courts need not require the 
permanent presence of a Delaware judge.  Rather, one can imagine a system of 
traveling judges who “ride circuit,” holding hearings in different locations as is 
convenient to litigating parties.76 This approach might make extraterritorial 
proceedings cost-effective even in jurisdictions where there is insufficient 
litigation to sustain a permanently sitting court.  
D. Abusive Litigation 
When the courts of, say, Delaware enter a judgment against a resident of 
a foreign jurisdiction, the courts of the foreign jurisdiction must, as a general 
principle,  be involved before the judgment can be executed against that person 
or her property within the foreign jurisdiction.77  To be sure, both within the United 
States and within the European Community, judgments from sister states 
typically undergo only a very limited amount of scrutiny before they are enforced.  
Thus, within the United States, many states78 have enacted the Uniform Foreign 
                                            
76 That was once the practice of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.  See, e.g., 
Lawrence W. Pierce, Appellate Advocacy: Some Reflections From the Bench, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 829, 831 (1993). 
 77 With regard to the situation where a foreign judgment is to be enforced in the 
United States see, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & 
SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1149 (3rd, ed. 2000) (noting that “judgment 
creditors must depend on the assistance of local courts for the recognition and 
enforcement of the judgment). 
 78 For a list of the relevant states see id. at 1164. 
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Judgments Act,79 which provides that, once its filing and notice requirements are 
met, a judgment handed down by a sister state court “has the same effect … as 
a judgment of a [court] of this state and may be enforced […] in the same 
manner.”  Similarly, in the European Community, Council Regulation (EC) No 
44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters80 greatly facilitates the 
enforcement of judgments handed down by courts in other Member States:  
According to art. 41 of that regulation, judgments from other Member States are 
declared enforceable as long as certain formal requirements are met.81  
In any case, one could argue that the procedural requirements that are 
imposed on a judgment creditor seeking to enforce a judgment from a foreign 
jurisdiction serve an important function.  They provide safeguards against 
abusive rulings of courts against persons who have no political representation or 
other protective ties in the trial court’s jurisdiction.  If extraterritorial courts were 
able to act directly on persons in the foreign jurisdiction in which they sat, one 
might be concerned that this protection would be lost. 
The obvious response is that a judgment handed down by a foreign court 
remains a foreign judgment even if the relevant court is located in the territory of 
the state where the judgment is to be enforced.  In other words, judgments of, 
say, Delaware’s extraterritorial courts have to be treated just as if they were 
judgments entered in the local courts of Delaware.  The purpose of extraterritorial 
courts is primarily to overcome communication barriers that impede out-of-state 
incorporation, and not to alter the balance of judicial power beyond that. 
E. Forum Shopping 
One may also be concerned that the creation of extraterritorial courts 
makes it easier for plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping.  To be sure, even now, 
Delaware does not usually force corporate litigants to sue in the Delaware Court 
of Chancery.82  Hence, there already exists some room for forum shopping.  
However, the creation of extraterritorial courts might well aggravate the problem.  
                                            
 79 9A U.L.A. 488 (1964). 
 80 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, 2001 O.J. 
(L 12),1-23.  
 81 See id, art. 41: “The judgment shall be declared enforceable immediately on 
completion of the formalities in Article 53 without any review under Articles 34 and 35. 
The party against whom enforcement is sought shall not at this stage of the proceedings 
be entitled to make any submissions on the application.” 
82 Note, however, that in a number of cases, the parties have no choice but to deal with 
Delaware’s Chancery Court.  See, e.g., 8 DEL. C. § 203 (e) (2004) (vesting the Chancery 
court with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters with respect to sec. 
203 of the General Corporation Law); 8 DEL. C. § 145 (k) (2004) (vesting the Court of 
Chancery with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all actions fro advancement 
of expenses and indemnification). 
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Two factors are particularly noteworthy in this context.  First, the creation of 
extraterritorial courts would allow plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping without 
having to forego the benefits of the Delaware judicial system.  In other words, 
plaintiffs could chose the court where their chances of winning look best and 
would still profit from the advantages in expertise and speed that Delaware 
courts have to offer.  Second, the creation of extraterritorial courts would make it 
much easier to use forum-shopping as a way of shopping for particular judges.  
After all, in at least some cases, extraterritorial courts may not have enough 
business to justify the presence of more than one judge.  Consequently, potential 
plaintiffs would know more or less exactly which judge will hear their case if they 
litigate in a particular extraterritorial court.  As a result, forum-shopping would be 
considerably more attractive in a system involving extraterritorial courts. 
 
Yet it is not clear that the creation of extraterritorial courts would 
necessarily lead to a considerable amount of forum shopping.  To begin with, 
under Delaware law, litigants are free to make use of forum selection clauses.83  
Hence, if an extraterritorial court were established in, say, Frankfurt, Germany, 
Delaware corporations based in Germany could presumably include, in their 
certificate of incorporation, a provision prescribing that all suits brought by 
shareholders and directors and relating to the internal matters of the corporation 
are to be brought in the Frankfurt branch of the Chancery Court.  In addition, the 
Delaware legislature could take various steps to reduce the risk of forum 
shopping.  One particularly drastic step would be to curtail the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Chancery in Wilmington in favor of various extraterritorial branches of 
that court.  For example, once a branch office of the Court of Chancery has been 
set up in Frankfurt, one could require all German-based firms to litigate there.  A 
less far-reaching measure would be to modify the forum non conveniens doctrine 
as it is now applied by Delaware courts.  At present, Delaware Courts will rarely 
disturb the plaintiff’s choice of forum when a Delaware corporation is sued in 
Delaware.  In fact, it will only invoke the forum non conveniens doctrine if it would 
mean an overwhelming hardship for the defendant to litigate in Delaware.84  In 
order to use the forum non conveniens doctrine as a means for preventing forum 
shopping, the Delaware legislature need only enact a statute according to which 
all branches of the Chancery Court except the one that is closest to the principal 
place of business of the corporation will generally be considered inconvenient 
forums.  In sum, increased forum shopping is by no means a necessary 
consequence of the creation of extraterritorial courts. 
 
Moreover, it is not clear that the parties’ ability to engage in forum 
shopping necessarily amounts, in this context, to a serious evil that must be 
avoided.   There are benefits as well as costs to forum shopping, in that it 
                                            
83 Elia Corp. v. Paul N. Howard Co., 391 A.2d 214, 216 (Del. Super. 1978). 
84 See Kolber v. Holyoke Shares, 213 A.2d 444, 446-47 (Del. 1965); Chrysler First Bus. 
Credit Corp. v. 1500 Locust Ltd. Partnership, 669 A.2d 104, 108 (Del. 1995); Taylor v. 
LSI Logic Corp., 689 A.2d 1196, 1197-98 (Del. 1997). 
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potentially permits the parties to choose the forum that best suits their needs.   
For example, consider a Delaware firm that has its principal place of business in 
Germany.  Such a firm may come to the conclusion that it would be highly 
advantageous to litigate its internal affairs before a judge who actually speaks 
German.  In that case, litigating in a Frankfurt branch of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery would be an obvious choice, presuming that the vice-Chancellor in 
charge of that branch has a command of the German language.  By contrast, if 
the relevant firm is a multinational giant, whose board room language has long 
been changed from German to English, litigating in Wilmington may seem as or 
more attractive.85 
IV. DO STATES HAVE SUFFICIENT INCENTIVES TO 
SET UP EXTRATERRITORIAL COURTS? 
Another potential problem with extraterritorial courts is that, even absent 
legal or practical obstacles, no important chartering jurisdiction might choose to 
create them. 
A. The Incentive to Set up Courts 
One motivation for a jurisdiction to set up extraterritorial courts is to 
enlarge the number of companies incorporating in the jurisdiction, and hence to 
gain more revenue in the form of franchise fees. This has clearly been an 
important incentive for Delaware.  To be sure, as others have pointed out, most 
other U.S. states may not be able to derive significant returns from the chartering 
business even if they choose to compete aggressively for corporate charters.86  
                                            
85 To be sure, at least one of the arguments that have traditionally been 
advanced against forum shopping might be invoked even where the choice of forum is a 
consensual one.  That is, one could argue that forum-shopping would lead the more 
popular courts to be overloaded with cases, while judges at other courts are twiddling 
their thumbs.  Cf., e.g., Kimberly A. Moore & Francesco Parisi, Symposium on 
Constructing International Intellectual Property Law: The Role of National Courts: 
Thinking Forum Shopping in Cyberspace, 77 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1325, 1333 (2002) 
(noting that forum shopping has traditionally been criticized on the ground that it 
“overburdens preferred courts with a flood of cases”). Yet, at least in the context at hand, 
if the parties prefer certain courts despite the delays that result from an excessive case 
load, that only means that the benefits of having the relevant court decide those cases 
outweigh any harm caused by the one-sided distribution of litigation.  See id.  Moreover, 
Delaware could adjust the size of its courts to the demand that these courts are facing:  
If it turns out that everyone wants to litigate in the Singapore branch of the Chancery 
Court because that branch has proven to be even better than the Wilmington one, then 
the Delaware legislature would only have to increase the number of judges working in 
that branch. 
86 Kahan & Kamar, supra note at 748 (concluding that even if states other than 
Delaware “attracted a substantial number of public corporations, they would neither earn 
Dammann & Hansmann, Extraterritorial Courts                                             P.  28
Nevertheless, that is not a sufficient reason to discount the motivational power of 
franchise fees.  For extraterritorial courts to play a significant role in corporate 
law, it is not necessary or even desirable that many states create such courts.  
Extraterritorial courts only make sense for the few states that are likely to attract 
a significant number of out-of-state firms.  In the United States, it is basically 
Delaware, Nevada,87 and Maryland88 that have fallen into this category.  Thus, 
the decisive question is whether the prospect of additional franchise fees is 
sufficient to motivate one or more of those states to create extraterritorial courts. 
From a purely financial perspective. the situation looks favorable.  The 
initial investment required should be quite limited.  It would be sufficient to rent 
suitable hearing room and office space, and to have a competent judge visit 
when need arises.  To be sure, the cost of operating permanent courts in foreign 
jurisdictions may be considerably higher than the costs of domestic courts.  Loss 
of economies of scale seems a particularly important concern in this respect.  At 
present, just one chancellor and four vice-chancellors handle all of Delaware’s 
corporate litigation.89  Litigation rates in foreign cities might be insufficient to 
occupy even one judge full-time.  Nevertheless, the cost of maintaining a single 
judge and her staff should be modest. 
In addition, there might arise substantial competitive pressure to create 
extraterritorial courts.  For example, Nevada might find the creation of 
extraterritorial courts especially attractive, because Nevada has shown a special 
interest in close corporations,90 which are likely to be particularly interested in 
being able to litigate close to the state where their businesses are conducted.  
Once Nevada starts setting up extraterritorial courts, however, Delaware may 
feel pressure to follow suit, for fear of leaving Nevada an opening to challenge 
Delaware’s dominance even among larger firms.  A parallel can clearly be seen 
in Delaware’s aggressive efforts to adopt attractive statutes for business trusts,91 
LLCs,92 LLPs,93 and LLLPs.94 
                                                                                                                                  
meaningful additional franchises taxes under their current tax structures nor profit 
significantly from an increase in legal business”). 
87 Of course, it has been rightly noted that Nevada’s success in attracting out-of-
state corporations has largely been restricted to close corporations.  See id. at 716-720. 
88 See id. at 721 (acknowledging that “Maryland […] attracts a fair number of 
companies headquartered elsewhere, [although] most of these firms are regulated 
investment companies”). 
89 Cf. 10 DEL. C. § 307 (2004) (decreeing that there be one Chancellor and four 
Vice-Chancellors).  
90 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 717 (stressing that “Nevada's marketing 
efforts are principally directed at a particular segment of close corporations.). 
 91 Cf. 12 DEL. C. § 3801-3824 (2004) (governing domestic statutory trusts). 
 92 Cf. 6 DEL. C. § 18 (2004) (governing the limited liability company) 
 93 Cf. 6 DEL. C. § 15-1001 (governing the formation of limited liability 
partnerships). 
 94 Cf. 6 DEL. C. § 17-214 (2004) (defining the preconditions for forming a limited 
liability limited partnership under Delaware law). 
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Finally, there is another reason why it may be desirable for states such as 
Delaware to set up extraterritorial courts.  As Roberta Romano has pointed out, 
corporations may be reluctant to incorporate in a given jurisdiction, if they have 
reason to fear that the quality of the law of the relevant state will deteriorate later 
on and if reincorporation is costly.95 Hence, to the extent that the costs of 
reincorporating are substantial, a jurisdiction needs to make a credible 
commitment that it will maintain the quality of its corporate law in the future.  With 
respect to U.S. corporations, Delaware has found a way of solving this problem.  
That is, Delaware has certain assets such as its courts and body of corporate law 
precedents that would lose most of their value, if Delaware did not continue to be 
one of the leading jurisdictions in the charter market.96  As a result, corporations 
headquartered in other U.S. states can be fairly sure that Delaware will continue 
to do its best to maintain the attractiveness of its corporate law.  With regard to 
corporations headquartered in other jurisdictions around the globe, however, the 
story is a bit more complicated.  To some extent, of course, such corporations 
have the same needs as U.S.-based corporations.  To the degree that that is the 
case, such corporations are not in need of any additional assurance that 
Delaware will safeguard their interests.  However, it should be noted that the 
interests of foreign-based corporations are not necessarily completely identical 
with those of U.S. based corporations.  After all, foreign-based firms operate in a 
different regulatory environment, especially when it comes to taxation and 
securities regulation.  As a result, the certainty that Delaware will continue to 
shape its law with a view to satisfying the needs of U.S. based corporations does 
not necessarily suffice to ensure foreign-based corporations that their future 
needs will also be met.  Hence, jurisdictions seeking to compete in the global 
charter market need to develop some way of signaling to foreign-based firms that 
their particular needs will also be respected in the future.  An obvious way of 
solving this problem is to invest in assets that are only valuable as long as 
foreign-based firms incorporate in Delaware.  Against this background, the 
establishment of extraterritorial courts in foreign countries becomes more than 
simply a mechanism for making litigation more convenient.  It could also be a 
way for jurisdictions such as Delaware to signal to firms in such countries that 
they will be taken seriously as consumers in the market for corporate charters 
and that their needs will be taken into account.  To send such a signal is all the 
more important, because whatever the costs of reincorporating within the U.S., 
the costs of reincorporating between a U.S. jurisdiction and a foreign one can be 
very high. 
B. Potential Incentives Not to Set up Courts 
The question remains, then, whether there are substantial incentives for 
states such as Delaware and Singapore not to set up extraterritorial courts.  In 
this context, at least two factors deserve mentioning. 
                                            
95 See ROMANO, supra note 11, at 37-44. 
96 Id.  
Dammann & Hansmann, Extraterritorial Courts                                             P.  30
1. The Influence of Corporate Lawyers and Other Local 
Interest Groups 
First – taking Delaware as an example -- local Delaware law firms might 
lobby Delaware lawmakers not to set up extraterritorial courts.  The motive is 
obvious:  If Delaware corporations started litigating in out-of-state courts, 
Delaware firms might lose clients.  It is not hard to see why Delaware lawmakers 
might tend to give in to pressure exerted by the local bar.  Not only is the 
Delaware bar a well-funded and highly organized interest group,97 but the 
success of Delaware in the charter market rests, to a considerable part, on the 
shoulders of local lawyers.  It is Delaware attorneys who, together with the 
Delaware courts, ensure the efficient litigation environment that allows the 
Delaware judiciary to flourish.  It is also the local bar that provides the experts 
who are behind the regular modernizations of Delaware corporate law.98   
This said, there may be ways of setting up extraterritorial courts that do 
not harm the interests of Delaware law firms.  If the creation of extraterritorial 
courts would in fact increase the overall size of the pie for a jurisdiction like 
Delaware, then presumably there is a way to divide the benefits that permits 
Delaware lawyers to benefit.  Rules like Delaware Chancery Court Rule 170, 
which effectively requires the hiring of Delaware lawyers as co-counsel,99 would 
of course be one possible approach.  Moreover, appellate litigation in Delaware’s 
Supreme Court, which would presumably continue to conduct its business 
primarily within the state, would surely increase with the spread of Delaware 
incorporations.  And even the business of the local Delaware chancery courts 
might increase with the growing number of Delaware firms worldwide, as parties 
for whom the burden of distance is not too great continue to prefer to litigate 
closer to the heart of the jurisdiction’s legal culture. 
                                            
 97 The advantages that Delaware lawyers enjoy as an interest group have been 
famously described by ., Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 506-07. 
98 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 489-490 (pointing out that “the 
Delaware legislature's drafting committees historically have been staffed with attorneys 
experienced in corporate law”).   
 99 Cf. DEL. CH. CT. R. 170  (2004).  Rule 170(a) provides that “[a]ny person 
admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of this State shall be entitled to practice as an 
attorney in this Court so long as such person remains entitled to practice in the Supreme 
Court and maintains an office in this State for the practice of law.”  According to Rule 
170 (b), “[a]ttorneys who are not members of the Delaware Bar may be admitted pro hac 
vice in the discretion of the Court and such admission shall be made only upon written 
motion by a member of the Delaware Bar who maintains an office in this State for the 
practice of law ("Delaware Counsel").  Furthermore, Rule 170(d) makes it clear that 
“Delaware counsel for any party shall appear in the action in which the motion for 
admission pro hac vice is filed and shall sign or receive service of all notices, orders, 
pleadings or other papers filed in the action, and shall attend all proceedings before the 
Court, Clerk of the Court, or other officers of the Court, unless excused by the Court.” 
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Much the same considerations apply to other local interest groups.  
Nevada, for example, has to date not sought to profit from corporate franchise 
fees, which remain at a token level.  Rather, Nevada’s incentive to attract 
corporate charters evidently is based heavily on its desire to attract business to 
local hotels, restaurants, places of entertainment, and service professionals.  
Those local interests might oppose extraterritorial Nevada courts, for fear of 
losing business.  But that is not a foregone conclusion, since overall their 
business might well increase if the result of extraterritorial courts were to lead 
Nevada the state to play a much larger role in the nation’s legal (and hence 
business) affairs. 
2. The Threat of Federalization 
Another factor worth mentioning is the threat of federalization.  As Mark 
Roe has recently explained, Delaware lawmakers have every reason to be 
extremely sensitive to the threat that the U.S. Congress might federalize 
corporate law, thereby cutting off the stream of revenues that Delaware derives 
from the franchise business.100  If Delaware were to establish courts in other U.S. 
states, it might appreciably increase the risk of federalization.  For one thing, 
Delaware corporation law would become even more conspicuously national law, 
making true nationalization of corporation law seem like a much smaller step.  
For another, once Delaware law had largely displaced state corporation law even 
for relatively small firms in other states, those other states would have less 
incentive to protest nationalization of corporation law, and might even, out of 
resentment toward the imperialistic Delaware, promote federalization. 
On the other hand, if the U.S. Congress were to provide expressly for the 
creation of extraterritorial courts, that act alone might – or might be framed to -- 
signal to Delaware and to other contenders in the charter market that the creation 
of extraterritorial state courts is considered beneficial and will not prompt the U.S. 
Congress to preempt state chartering. 
V. EXTRATERRITORIAL COURTS VERSUS 
ARBITRATION 
The question remains whether extraterritorial courts are not superfluous 
because of the availability of international commercial arbitration, which is 
already well developed under the auspices of organizations such as the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA), and the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA).  There is good 
reason to believe, however, that arbitration is not an adequate substitute for 
extraterritorial courts.   
                                            
100 Cf. Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 601 (2003) 
(pointing out that “Delaware players have reason to fear that if they misstep, they will 
lose their lawmaking business”). 
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A. The Parties’ Perspective 
The advantages and drawbacks of commercial arbitration from the 
litigants’ point of view are well known.  In the area of corporate law, however, the 
benefits of arbitration have little importance, whereas the drawbacks weigh 
particularly heavily. 101   
1. The Benefits of Arbitration 
On the plus side, arbitration may offer speedy decisions,102 expert 
decision-makers,103 and (at least from the U.S. perspective) cost savings.104  The 
chances of preserving the underlying business relationship are also said to be 
greater in case of commercial arbitration.105  
Moreover, when it comes to international commercial arbitration, there 
may be additional advantages.  At present it may be easier to get the resulting 
decision recognized and enforced in both countries.  While the proposed Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters106 is still languishing on the negotiation table, more than 
                                            
101 As regards the U.S. context, a similar point is made by G. Richard Shell, 
Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C.L. REV. 517, 572-573 (1989).  According 
to him, „[p]ractical as well as transaction cost factors suggest that arbitration in the public 
shareholder context will remain the exception rather than the rule”.  See id. at 572.  He 
names three reasons to support that view.  To begin with, he notes that disputes may 
arise with regard to the arbitration clause itself.  He also points out that arbitration does 
not work particularly well in complex settings and that defendants may be concerned 
about the possibility that an arbitrator may award punitive or multiple damages.  Finally, 
he points out to the particular expertise of Delaware’s judges. 
102 C. Christine Fahrenback, Note, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky 
Reefer: A Change in Course: COGSA Does Not Invalidate Foreign Arbitration Clauses in 
Maritime, 29 AKRON L. REV. 371, 395 (1996); William Wang, International Arbitration: 
The Need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1059, 1060 
(2003) 
103 Cf. Fahrenback, supra note 102, at 395 (noting that the parties can select their 
decision-makers in case of commercial arbitration). 
104 Fahrenback, supra note 102, at 395.  For a more qualified statement see 
William Wang, International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform Interim Measures of 
Relief, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1059, 1060 (2003) (“While consideration must be given to 
the fact that the arbitrators have to be paid (whereas judges of a court do not), it is not 
unusual to hear the suggestion that arbitration is cheaper than litigation.”).  Although the 
view that arbitration is less expensive than litigation seems to be widely accepted in the 
U.S. literature, among German lawyers the opposite view is often expressed, perhaps 
reflecting differences in the cost structure of litigation in Germany. 
105 Fahrenback, supra note 102, at 395; William Wang, International Arbitration: 
The Need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1059, 1060 
(2003) 
106 Available at: http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html. 
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125 countries have signed the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention107 or the 
1961 European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.108 Moreover, 
in the case of arbitration, the parties can choose the language they like best, and 
they may also value the existence of a neutral forum.109   
Yet, despite the multitude of advantages that (international) arbitration is 
said to offer, they may often be unimportant in the context of corporate law.  As 
far as the prospect of speedy decisions and expert decision-makers are 
concerned, Delaware law may offer the same advantages.110  After all, speed 
and expertise are precisely the qualities that Delaware’s judges are famous for.  
To be sure, as far as speed is concerned, arbitrators may reach their decision 
even faster than Delaware courts, namely by limiting discovery111 and by making 
sure that there is no possibility to appeal their decision.112 However, there is no 
reason to believe the parties would be willing to pay that price.  In particular, 
shareholders will often find it difficult to pursue their rights if discovery is limited, 
which in turn would make the relevant corporate law less attractive to investors. 
It is also questionable whether arbitration can offer substantial advantages 
in terms of costs when compared to Delaware.  To the extent that cost savings 
result from speed, they can largely be realized in Delaware courts as well.  To 
the extent that they result from the avoidance of court fees, it is worth noting that 
Delaware courts charge only minimal fees.113 Finally, to the extent that costs are 
saved by limiting discovery114 and by reducing the role of law in resolving 
conflicts, it is, once again, very dubious whether many parties are willing to pay 
                                            
107 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force with regard to the 
United States Dec. 29, 1970). 
 108 See Helen Z. Kryshtalowych & Claudia T. Salomon, Current Development: 
Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards and Foreign Judgments in Ukraine, 12 AM. REV. INT'L 
ARB. 425, 425 (2001). 
109 See, e.g., William Wang, International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform 
Interim Measures of Relief, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1059, 1060 (2003) („Parties tend to 
prefer settlement in a neutral forum, rather than submitting to the jurisdiction of another 
party's home nation.) 
110 Cf. also Shell, supra note 101, at 572-573 (suggesting that arbitrators may not 
be superior to Delaware courts in terms of speed and expertise).  
111 Cf. Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and 
Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. 
REV. 687, 755-56 (1997) (claiming that [a]rbitral discovery […] is limited because 
arbitration derives its advantages of speed and low cost in large part from the fact that 
discovery arbitration is less extensive than in litigation“). 
112 Cf. Bales, supra note 111, at 757 (“Restrictions on the right to appeal 
effectively make the arbitral award final, eliminating a lengthy and expensive appellate 
process.“). 
113 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 1, at 1256 n.160. 
114 Cf. Bales, supra note 111, at 755-56 (1997) (claiming that “[a]rbitral discovery 
[…] is limited because arbitration derives its advantages of speed and low cost in large 
part from the fact that discovery in arbitration is less extensive than in litigation“) 
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that price.  Many potential investors may be deterred if their rights are subject to 
the uncertainties of arbitration. 
Similarly, the wish to salvage a business relationship typically will not play 
a major role in corporate law, at least where publicly traded corporations are 
concerned.  A shareholder seeking to attack a self-dealing transaction has no 
interest in saving the relationship with the manager in question, and neither does 
a shareholder claiming that the managers of the corporation violated their 
fiduciary duties in defending against a hostile takeover attempt. 
Even the particular advantages that arbitration seems to offer in the 
international arena lose much of their luster when analyzed in the context of 
corporate law.  For example, the ability to pick a particular language in arbitration 
proceedings no longer presents an advantage if one assumes that Delaware 
courts offer the same benefit.  Similarly, there is no reason to believe that 
Delaware courts will be biased against foreign plaintiffs.  After all, neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant will usually reside in Delaware.  Of course, one could 
argue that Delaware courts may be biased in favor of managers, given that 
corporate managers have considerable influence in determining where the 
corporation will be incorporated.115  However, that argument has little weight in 
the context at hand, because arbitrators face a similar problem.  Just as 
Delaware may seek to pander to managers rather than to shareholders, knowing 
that the former will decide about the future of the business-relationship, 
arbitrators may attempt to pander to managers,116 knowing full well that 
managers rather than shareholders will end up devising the arbitration clause 
and picking the arbitrator.  Of course, that bias should not be overestimated in 
either case.  Just as Delaware wants to protect its reputation as a state with 
investor-friendly law, arbitrators will want to protect their reputation as well. 
Finally, consider the problem of the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.  While there is no uniform practice regarding the international 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in corporate matters, there is little 
reason to believe that this issue presents significant practical problems, at least 
                                            
 115 The claim that Delaware’s courts will put the interests of managers over those 
of shareholders is at the heart of the race-to-the-bottom theory.  After all, Cary, who 
thought that Delaware favored managers over shareholders in order to attract 
corporations, also argued that Delaware’s judges closely identified with the interests of 
the state and the local bar. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 692 (1974). 
116 The risk that arbitrators might be biased in favor of “repeat players” is often 
noted in the context of employment arbitration.  See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat 
Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment 
Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 224 (1998) (finding that “that repeat 
player employers do better in arbitration than one-shotters”); William R. Corbett, Waiting 
for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century: Everything Old Is New Again, 23 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259 (2002) (noting the risk of a repeat player effect in case of 
mandatory arbitration). 
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among western countries.117  A crucial source for the non-enforcement of foreign 
judgments, namely the feeling that the court that has issued the judgment has 
interpreted its jurisdiction too broadly,118 is unlikely to play a role in the area of 
corporate law, where the jurisdiction of Delaware courts is based on nothing less 
than the corporate domicile.119 Similarly, two other central problems with respect 
to the enforcement of U.S. judgments, namely concerns about jury verdicts as 
well as about punitive damages awards120, are not an issue when it comes to 
Delaware corporate law. 
2. The Drawbacks of International Commercial Arbitration 
While the advantages of (international) commercial arbitration seem 
modest in the area of corporate law, the disadvantages weigh particularly 
heavily.  The drawbacks of (international) commercial arbitration are well-known. 
They include, in particular, the inability to receive interim relief,121 a compromised 
instead of a clear-cut result,122 limited discovery,123 lack of coercive power on the 
                                            
117 The conventional wisdom is that it may be difficult to get U.S. judgments 
recognized and enforced abroad.  See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Symposium: The 
Impact of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice on International Business 
Transactions: The U.S. Regime, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L 327, 351 (2004) (claming that 
“m]any countries are quite restrictive when it comes to enforcing judgments rendered by 
courts in the United States.).  However, the risk that U.S. judgments are not recognized 
abroad may tend to be overstated.  Cf. Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial is our 
Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to 
Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 170-71 (suspecting that „judgments obtained by U.S. 
lawyers who follow proper procedures are readily recognized and enforced abroad”). 
118 With regard to the role of jurisdictional questions in the non-recognition of U.S. 
judgments abroad see, e.g., Silberman, supra note 117, at 351 (noting that “[o]rdinary, 
plain, vanilla U.S. money-judgments are often not enforced because certain countries 
restrict enforcement of foreign country judgments to those rendered on a limited set of 
jurisdictional grounds”). 
119 Silberman, supra note 117, at 351 n.79, cites the Swiss Private International 
Law Statute as an example of a statute recognizing only a limited set of bases of foreign 
jurisdiction.  Yet according to her description of Swiss law, the defendant’s domicile is 
one of these bases. 
120 Cf. Peter Schlosser, Speech/Lecture: Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation 
Systems and American Cooperation With Those Systems, 45 KAN. L. REV. 9, 47 (1996) 
(describing European reservations vis-à-vis the enforcement of jury verdicts and punitive 
damage awards). 
121 Fahrenback, supra note 102, at 395. 
122 Fahrenback, supra note 102, at 395. 
123 Fahrenback, supra note 102, at 395; G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other 
Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" 
for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 534 (1990) (noting that pretrial discovery is limited 
in case of arbitration); Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and 
Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. 
REV. 687, 755-56 (1997) (claiming that [a]rbitral discovery […] is limited because 
arbitration derives its advantages of speed and low cost in large part from the fact that 
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part of the court,124 and lack of judicial review.125  Last but not least, arbitration 
may run into difficulties in case of multi-party suits.126 
All of these factors are particularly relevant in corporate law.  Interim relief 
plays an immense role when it comes to corporate mergers and other decisions 
that cannot easily be corrected ex post.  Similarly, the restrictions upon the 
discovery process are problematic, because shareholders will often find 
discovery indispensable to make effective use of their rights.  Furthermore, 
corporate litigation often involves multiple parties.  Most importantly, however, 
the informal, compromising character of arbitration puts the bonding value of 
corporate law norms at risk. 
B. Society as a Whole 
In addition to what has been said above, litigation also has advantages 
from the point of view of society as a whole that arbitration cannot match.  Thus, 
there are considerable benefits to having the law of the state applied by the 
courts of that state itself.  First, the resulting case law will probably be more 
coherent.  Second and more importantly, the parties will find the application of 
the substantive law that is relevant to their case far more predictable if that law is 
applied by the same court that created the relevant case law in the first place.  In 
other words, it is probably easier to predict how Delaware courts will apply 
Delaware law than it would be to predict how the International Chamber of 
Commerce will apply Delaware law.  Hence, even institutionalized arbitration 
probably cannot function as an adequate alternative to extraterritorial courts. 
C. Practical Experience 
Strong evidence that, when all is considered, private arbitration will not 
provide a clearly superior alternative to extraterritorial courts is that, within the 
U.S., arbitration of corporate law disputes appears extremely rare.  Even for 
states with judiciaries much less expert and efficient than that of Delaware, 
                                                                                                                                  
discovery arbitration is less extensive than in litigation“).  Of course, some scholars note 
that broad discovery rules can, at times, be a disadvantage rather than an advantage.  
Cf., e.g., Patricia Anne Kuhn, Comment, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale: The 
Supreme Court's Misguided Approach to the Hague Evidence Convention, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 1011, 1047 n.263 (1989). 
124 William Wang, International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform Interim 
Measures of Relief, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1059, 1060-61 (2003) („A major 
disadvantage of arbitration is the arbitral tribunal's lack of coercive power necessary to 
support the process. Such powers might be required to compel discovery, the 
attendance of witnesses, or in the extreme, control over the movement of the parties and 
their assets. An arbitrator has no coercive power over third parties.“). 
125 Fahrenback, supra note 102, at 395. 
126 William Wang, International Arbitration: The Need for Uniform Interim 
Measures of Relief, 28 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1059, 1061 (2003) (Multiparty disputes are 
an area where the tools of traditional litigation may be more helpful than arbitration.) 
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dispute resolution takes place almost exclusively in the public courts – though 
those courts may include the federal courts, where cases are sometimes taken in 
search of greater expertise or impartiality. 
VI. EXTRATERRITORIAL COURTS OUTSIDE 
CORPORATE LAW 
To this point, we have largely limited our analysis to extraterritorial courts 
whose jurisdiction is limited to matters of corporate law.  Much of what we have 
said, however, applies as well to other areas of commercial law.  Moreover, even 
with regard to non-economic law, the establishment of extraterritorial courts may 
offer certain benefits.  We briefly touch here on some of the relevant 
considerations. 
A. The Usefulness of Extraterritorial Courts outside of 
Corporate Law 
When it comes to assessing the usefulness of extraterritorial courts, it is 
helpful to distinguish among three categories. 
1. Extraterritorial Application of a Jurisdiction’s Law 
To begin with, there are those cases where a jurisdiction’s law is applied 
to relationships between persons who will find it more convenient to litigate 
outside the territory of the jurisdiction in question.  As pointed out above, 
corporate law falls into this category, because the vast majority of U.S. 
corporations, as well as their shareholders, have no substantial contacts with 
Delaware beyond the corporate domicile.  However, there are similar cases 
outside the scope of corporate law.  Contract law is a conspicuous example.  
Within the U.S., firms incorporated and doing business in other states frequently 
choose New York law to govern their contracts. Similarly, firms from different 
Member States of the European Community will often agree that UK law should 
govern their contracts, both in order to choose a “neutral” law and forum and 
because English has long become the lingua franca in Europe.  In these cases, 
the establishment of extraterritorial courts would be beneficial for the same 
reasons that it would be beneficial in corporate law, the most important factor 
being the prospect that access to courts familiar with the relevant body of law is 
made cheaper and more convenient. 
2. Uniform Law 
A second area where the establishment of extraterritorial courts holds 
particular promise concerns the application of uniform law.  As has been pointed 
out above, one of the advantages of extraterritorial courts is that they allow the 
consumers of judicial services to pick the courts that they like best.  Of course, 
litigants will generally want to avoid courts that are not familiar with the 
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substantive law at issue.  Hence, as a general matter, few parties will want to 
litigate a dispute involving local law before a foreign court.  However, concerns 
about a foreign court’s lack of expertise should play a much smaller role if and to 
the extent that the applicable substantive law is uniform across jurisdictions.  An 
obvious example within the United States would be the uniform commercial code; 
in the international arena, one could point to the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).127  To be sure, a caveat 
seems appropriate:  Even to the extent that statutes are “uniform” across 
jurisdictions, the same need not be true of their interpretation.  For that reason, 
the expertise of foreign courts may remain an issue even where the law 
governing a case is uniform law. 
3. Other 
Finally, there may be some benefits to the establishment of extraterritorial 
courts even in those cases where those courts would apply neither their own 
jurisdiction’s law nor uniform law.  After all, there may be situations where the 
reputation of a particular jurisdiction’s court system is so bad that the parties 
would rather tolerate a possible lack of expertise on the part of a foreign court 
than entrust themselves to the courts of their own jurisdiction.  We suspect, 
though, that these situations should be rare.  To be sure, there is no lack of 
countries with inadequate judicial infrastructure.  However, an inefficient court 
system will often go hand in hand with inefficient substantive law, if only because 
inept courts will find it difficult to produce a coherent body of precedent.   
 
B. Should Access to Extraterritorial Courts be Restricted? 
Are there, however, particular reasons why access to extraterritorial courts 
should be restricted outside of corporate law?  Two types of interests are in 
questions here:  those of the litigants themselves, and those of the host state. 
1. Protecting Litigants 
One might be concerned that, by permitting one state to set up its courts 
in the territory of another state, one or another party to a dispute might be led to 
litigate in a court where their interests will be poorly protected.  It is not obvious, 
however, that extraterritorial courts are particularly prone to this problem.  The 
central issue here is which state’s courts have jurisdiction over any given dispute.  
The creation of extraterritorial courts need not change the existing rules of law in 
that regard.  And, once it is conceded that the courts of a given state have 
jurisdiction over a dispute, the fact that the state’s courts are not just located 
within the state’s territory, but in other locales as well, seems unlikely to prejudice 
                                            
127 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 
1980, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668. 
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significantly the interests of either party to a suit.  On the contrary, it should 
increase the chances that the parties can find a convenient forum.   
In the commercial matters for which extraterritorial courts seem best 
suited, parties often can and do put forum selection clauses in their agreements.  
Perhaps one might be worried that the availability of extraterritorial courts would 
increase the potential for an overreaching party to a contract to impose an 
inappropriate forum on the other contracting party.  But here, too, the increased 
hazard seems small.  Contractual clauses specifying foreign law and a distant 
forum are already available for opportunistic as well as advantageous use.  It is 
not clear that choice of forum clauses selecting an extraterritorial foreign court 
create greater risk for the parties than do forum selection clauses selecting a 
foreign court that is located in the territory of another jurisdiction. 
2. Protecting the Interests of the Host State 
Might a host state have an interest in restricting access to foreign courts 
established on its territory, even when the parties directly involved are not 
disserved by litigating in extraterritorial courts?  Again, the central issue seems 
one of jurisdiction.  If a state already recognizes the authority of a another state’s 
courts to try a given issue, in what ways might the interests of the first state be 
affected adversely if the second state’s proceeding is held on the first state’s 
soil?  One can easily see that some discreditable interests might be served.  For 
example, if the extraterritorial courts are more efficient or honest than those of 
the host state, their presence in the host state might facilitate invidious 
comparisons to the embarrassment of the host state’s government. 
Or perhaps, more broadly, a potential host state might be concerned that, 
by greatly facilitating access to a foreign state’s courts, the presence of 
extraterritorial courts might lead a much larger share of the host state’s citizens 
to choose to have their commercial affairs governed by foreign law, thereby 
undercutting the ability of the host state to rule its own citizens.  But this concern, 
too, has a protectionist flavor.  If the law of a given state is sufficiently 
unattractive to lead its citizens to wish to be governed by another state’s laws, is 
there a good reason to deny them the choice?  And if there is a good reason – 
for example, the need to maintain sufficient economies of scale in litigation to 
keep the host state’s courts (and perhaps legislature) functioning efficiently – 
then is this not also an argument for changing the choice of law rule to prevent 
the state’s citizens from having recourse to foreign law, regardless of where the 
foreign courts do their business? 
These concerns do not seem compelling in the field of corporate law, and 
they do not seem particularly more compelling in other areas of commercial law.   
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Substantive corporate law is becoming increasingly dissociated from the 
geographic jurisdictions that promulgate the law, as firms become ever freer to 
choose the jurisdiction whose law will govern their affairs.  A logical next step is 
to remove as well the territoriality of the courts that decide matters of corporate 
law, and perhaps other matters of commercial law as well.  The result could be 
not just one but several competing versions of a modern international law 
merchant, providing legal systems with the scope appropriate for increasingly 
global markets while avoiding the creation of a single centralized lawmaker 
whose monopoly position might make it unresponsive to the needs of commerce. 
 
